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REAL ARROW-SECURITIES FOR ALL: JUST AND EFFICIENT
INSURANCE THROUGH MACRO-HEDGING
ROBERT HOCKETT*
Abstract
As a new hurricane season opened in June of 2006, it emerged
that a number of onlines gaming sites were offering bettors the
opportunity to wager on whether New Orleans might suffer another
Katrina calamity. Commentators condemned the announced practice
with howls of disgust, labeling it both tasteless and heartless. Perhaps
they were right. All I could think about as one who grew up in New
Orleans, however, was how risk pools might hereby be broadened to
include all the world’s bettors. We shouldn’t condemn these people; we
should use them—while requiring that they maintain margin accounts
at their betting sites. For to bet on an event’s happening is a way to
insure against it, and there are currently more things we’re able to bet
on than to purchase ordinary insurance policies against.
This essay elaborates and draws consequences from that
observation. In a manner I hope is more concretely appreciable and
intuitively graspable than in more technical work I did some years
back, I work to show that we have it within our power to spread risks
both more justly and more efficiently than we do now—in effect by
designing new hedging instruments suitable for “ordinary Janes and
Joes.” In this sense the essay amounts to a contribution to the project
of “democratizing” finance. Working along such lines now seems
particularly worthwhile, as more and more people below the tops of
our income and wealth distributions face more and more uninsurable
risks—both to labor incomes and to that one form of wealth which they
hold when they hold anything more than mere “human capital”—their
homes.
*

Professor of Enterprise-Organizational and Finance-Regulatory Law, Cornell
Law School; Founding Board Member, The Occupy Money Cooperative;
Fellow, The Century Foundation; recent Consulting Counsel, International
Monetary Fund; and recent Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Many thanks to Tobias Adrian, Dan Alpert, Kaushik Basu, Mike
Campbell, Bob Frank, Henry Hansmann, Daniel Markovits, Jerry Mashaw,
Aziz Rana, John Roemer, Nouriel Roubini, Bob Shiller, Bill Simon, Sascha
Somek, Peter Spiegler, Art Wilmarth, and especially Saule Omarova for many
helpful discussions of the subjects of this essay.
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Introduction
As a new hurricane season opened in June of 2006, it emerged
that a number of online gaming sites were offering bettors the
opportunity to wager on whether New Orleans might suffer another
Katrina calamity.1 Commentators condemned the announced practice
with howls of disgust, labeling it both tasteless and heartless.2 Perhaps
they were right. All I could think about as one who grew up in New
Orleans, however, was how risk pools might hereby be broadened to
include all the world’s bettors. We shouldn’t condemn these people; we
should use them—while requiring that they maintain margin accounts
at their betting sites. For to bet on an event’s happening is a way to
insure against it,3 and there are currently more things we’re able to bet
on than to purchase ordinary insurance policies against.
This essay elaborates on, and draws consequences from, that
observation. In a manner I hope is more concretely appreciable and
intuitively graspable than in more technical work I did some years
back,4 I work to show that we have it within our power to spread risks
1

See, e.g., Wanna Bet That a Hurricane Will Hit U.S.? Now You Can, USA
TODAY (July 4, 2006, 11:08 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/
hurricane/2006-07-02-hurricane-betting_x.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
2RXY-2ZTP.
2
Id.
3
See Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging:
Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for SystemicIncome-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy,” 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 210-11 (2004) [hereinafter Just
Insurance].
4
See generally id.; Robert C. Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A
Meta-Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Deep
Grammar of Distribution]; Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe:
Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and Policy, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 391 (2009) [hereinafter Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe]; Robert
Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare (Cornell L. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-031,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1309699 [hereinafter Pareto Versus Welfare]; Robert Hockett, Taking
Distribution Seriously (Cornell L. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-004, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217
[hereinafter Taking Distribution Seriously], archived at http://perma.cc/ZZN35G3Q; Robert Hockett, Market Completeness, Market Neutrality, and
Ethically Cognizable Efficiency: An Ordinal Equivalence Theorem (2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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both more justly and more efficiently than we do now—in effect by
designing new hedging instruments suitable for “ordinary Janes and
Joes.” In this sense the essay amounts to a contribution to the project of
“democratizing” finance. Working along such lines now seems
particularly worthwhile, as more and more people below the tops of our
income and wealth distributions face more and more uninsurable
risks—both to labor incomes and to that one form of wealth which they
hold when they hold anything more than mere “human capital”—their
homes.
To see why this project might be important to more than just
New Orleanians, consider the following. Many contemporary societies
appear to be vexed of late by two complementary trends. One is
dramatic and still-worsening income and wealth inequality.5 The other
is income and wealth insecurity on the part of those under the tops of
those inequalities.6 There also appear to be at least two distinct drivers
of the two mentioned trends. First is that those under the tops of the
relevant inequalities derive most of their incomes from labor rather
than capital, while returns to the latter outpace returns to the former
through time.7 Second is that markets as we presently find them afford
5

See, e.g., Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market
Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Finance (2013)
[hereinafter Income Inequality and Market Fragility] (under review by E.
ECON. REV.) (manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710, archived at http://perma.cc/U3S7-HGZP.
6
See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 110-11; Robert Hockett,
Making Sense of the Health Care Reform Debate, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 2010,
at 28, 49-51 [hereinafter Making Sense].
7
See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Materializing Citizenship: Finance in a Producers’
Republic, 63 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2071, 2084 (2014), http://law.emory.edu/
elj/documents/volumes/63/6/online/hockett.pdf [hereinafter Materializing
Citizenship], archived at http://perma.cc/5F59-MHW7; cf. Robert Hockett,
What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other
SOPs, and “Ownership Societies,” 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 877 (2007)
[hereinafter What Kinds of Stock]. See generally Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in
the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership
Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005) [hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means]; Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Whose Ownership?]. See also, of
course, THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014), which has drawn sorely needed public attention at
last to this development. For two interesting earlier works along these lines, see
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little opportunity to diversify risks that attend income or wealth
deriving entirely from (a) labor on the one hand, and (b) that principal
form of nonhuman capital which most of the nonwealthy hold when
they hold anything other than human capital, on the other hand—their
homes.8
If you’ll pardon the pun, the first mentioned driver of inequality and insecurity is a matter of capital importance in any polity
founded, as was ours in the U.S., on what I call a “productive
republican” ethos.9 Productive republican citizens tend to favor stocks
over flows, property over contract, and private over public, such that
welfare state transfer systems tend over time to fall prey to political
suspicion and squabbling.10 For this reason much of my research and
writing concerns how we might act collectively to make individual
capital-owners of more citizens.11 This work, I anticipate, will
continue.12
I also believe, however, that the second mentioned driver of
inequality and insecurity matters a great deal, and I’ve accordingly
written on this also.13 But there is much more to be said—particularly
in light of the just mentioned prospect of spreading more capital more
widely to more citizens.14 For success with that project itself will
generally ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA, LABOR, CAPITAL, AND FINANCE:
INTERNATIONAL FLOWS (2001); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and
the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519 (1997). See also Hockett,
Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 110.
8
See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 213-221.
9
See Hockett, Materializing Citizenship, supra note 7, at 2072 & n.5.
10
The idea is that entitlements secured by property rights are more secure than
those secured by contract or government “entitlement program.” That in turn
means that already accumulated property—stocks—are more secure than
future income—flows—even when one is legally entitled to the latter. See
generally id. for more on this complex of thought, its apparent historical
origins, and its manifestations in American public policy since the founding.
11
See generally Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra
note 7; Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3; Hockett, Materializing
Citizenship, supra note 7; Hockett, What Kinds of Stock, supra note 7; Hockett,
Whose Ownership?, supra note 7.
12
See, e.g., Robert Hockett, A Republic of Owners: Jeffersonian Democracy,
Hamiltonian Finance, and a Blueprint for Permanent Post-Crisis Recovery
(2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
13
See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3.
14
See supra text accompanying note 11.
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occasion new risks—risks to the incomes the new capital generates.
Hence there are at least two complementary reasons to query whether
we might more fully complete our risk-diversification markets: (a) to
lessen income and wealth insecurities currently faced by our nonwealthy citizens, and (b) to minimize such insecurities as might later
face citizens once we make capital-owners of more of them.
Why worry about these things, you might ask. My reasons
sound in both justice and efficiency. As to the first, some distributions
of wealth, income, and risk are just wrongful.15 Most societies aim to
minimize wrongful, and to vindicate rightful, distributions—that’s part
of what property, contract, tort and criminal law, not to mention tax and
other policies, sometimes are about.16 As to efficiency, dramatic wealth
and income disparities tend, as I have shown elsewhere, to issue in
wealth-destructive forms of market volatility.17 Our most recent crisis,
in fact, is demonstrably a case in point.18 But dramatic disparities in
risk-bearing can be inefficient as well—not only as causes in reinforcing the volatility-inducing effects of wealth and income disparities
themselves, but also as manifestations, in evidencing the absence of
markets that channel risks to their most efficient bearers.19
We have known since Ken Arrow’s, Gerard Debreu’s, and
Lionel McKenzie’s pioneering work of over half a century ago that
introducing certain state-contingent claims to a market can, by
“completing” that market—that is, by enabling its participants to price
and provide against unpleasant future contingencies in the same
currency they use to buy goods and services—facilitate its reaching a
state of Walrasian general equilibrium, with all the efficiency features
that such states entail.20 We also have known, since likewise pioneering
15

See generally, e.g., Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 4; see
also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 111; infra Part II.
16
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 111-12.
17
See generally Hockett & Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility,
supra note 5.
18
See, e.g., id. at 12 & fig.1.
19
See infra Part III; see also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 256.
20
See generally GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières pour la Répartition la Meilleure des
Risques, 40 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE
NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); see also Maurice
Allais, Généralisation des Théories de L’Equilibre Economique Général et du
Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 40 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES
INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE
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work by Bill Baumol, Serge-Christophe Kolm, Elisha Pazner, David
Schmeidler, and Hal Varian done some twenty years later, that such an
equilibrium, if reached via trades that proceed from an equal division of
resources among trading agents, will be fully as fair, on a plausible
understanding of fairness, as it is efficient.21
We have not known, however, what I believe to be two equally
important things.
The first is that, on any ethically interesting conception of
efficiency, to render a market more “complete” in the sense just alluded
to is likewise to render it both more efficient and more fair in the sense
just alluded to.22 And the second is that we can actually render our
markets much more complete, hence more fair and efficient, than they
currently are. We can do that essentially by designing a variety of what
would nowadays be called “state claims,” or “Arrow securities, “a kind
of derivative aimed at enabling people below the tops of their national
income and wealth distributions to insure both their housing wealth and
their labor incomes.23 And this means, in light of the foregoing, that by

81 (1953); Maurice Allais, L’Extension des Théories de l’Equilibre Economique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 21 ECONOMETRICA
269 (1953). The results are anticipated by J. R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL
(2d ed. 1946), the theory of which generalizes from observations of the
behavior of early twentieth century British futures markets. A thorough
contemporary synthesis of prior and recent developments is 1 MICHAEL
MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996). An
interesting recent account of the work of Arrow, Debreu, and McKenzie,
suitable for a popular audience, is TILL DÜPPE & E. ROY WEINTRAUB, FINDING
EQUILIBRIUM: ARROW, DEBREU, MCKENZIE AND THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC
CREDIT (2014).
21
See, e.g., SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM, JUSTICE ET ÉQUITÉ (1972); SOCIAL
GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ELISHA PAZNER
(Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 1985); Hal R. Varian, Equity, Envy, and Efficiency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY 63 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Two Problems in the
Theory of Fairness, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976). A helpful synthesis is
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS (1986).
22
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 4, at 1238-39;
Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe, supra note 4, at 403; Hockett, Pareto
Versus Welfare, supra note 4, at 2-3; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously,
supra note 4, at 74-76; Hockett, Market Completeness, supra note 4.
23
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 237-38; Hockett, Taking
Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 74-75; infra Part IV.
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designing and facilitating markets for such state claims as these we can
render our economies more just and efficient.24
My hope with this essay, then, is to elaborate and substantiate
these last two claims in an intuitively accessible manner, since I have
done so in more formal manners elsewhere.25 I’d like, in other words, to
show in a straightforward way just how easily we might act collectively
to render income and wealth risk more individually insurable, thereby
bringing greater justice and efficiency to our economies.
Here, then, is how I’ll proceed. Part I first tells an all-toofamiliar tale of two middle class citizens who work hard and “play” by
the proverbial “rules,” but face risks to their incomes and accumulated
possessions that presently are not insurable. It then suggests that, for
reasons that sound in both justice and efficiency, we should as a polity
hope to find means of enabling ourselves and our fellow citizens to
insure against such risks where possible. We should, in other words,
collectively enable ourselves individually to provide against risks that
uniquely attend each of our livelihoods and, when we have them, our
assets.
Part II then explains with more care what I mean by “both just
and efficient” when I speak of “both just and efficient insurance.” It
does so by systematically cataloguing deep analytical parallels between
justice and insurance theory. Part III then returns to the tale told in Part
I, systematically showing both why, by reference to insurance theory,
efficient markets for the needed insurance are missing, and why, by
reference to justice theory, we should in justice wish to supply such
markets where possible. Parts IV and V then show how we can supply
such markets, thereby effecting a simultaneously more just, and more
efficient, distribution of basic risks faced by our citizens. Part VI
presents a conclusion that wraps things up and looks forward.

24

See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 237-38; infra Part V.
See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3; Hockett, Deep
Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22; Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t
Prescribe, supra note 22; Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare, supra note 22;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15; Hockett, Market
Completeness, supra note 22.

25
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Motivating the Proposal: Bob & Barbara Go Steadily,
Faultlessly, Needlessly Bust

I’ll start with a story that might ring familiar.26 Meet Bob and
Barbara. Bob is a small town lawyer. He has been in practice since the
mid-1980s, when he graduated from his state university law school. He
is in his mid-fifties, and is pretty good at what he does. His practice
involves, primarily, drafting wills and advising private parties in estateplanning, assisting small business people in the formation of business
partnerships or limited liability companies and the drafting of contracts,
facilitating small business transactions and negotiations, and like work.
When Bob decided to become a lawyer, the town where he
lived and grew up was humble but reasonably prosperous. Its population had been by and large stable in size, perhaps slowly growing, for
decades. It was a pleasant, easy place to live. Bob was very much taken
with the character of Atticus Finch in the Harper Lee novel, and went
to law school with the aim of becoming his own town’s Atticus. Upon
graduating he returned to his home town, hung out a shingle, soon
married his high school sweetheart, Barbara, who had attended the
business school at Bob’s university and now owned a small sole
proprietorship, and made a down-payment on a stately, one hundred
year-old “fixer-upper” of a late Victorian home.
Soon Bob and Barbara began to bring children into the world.
Bob did not make a great deal of money in his practice, but he earned
enough, when added to Barbara’s income, to keep the family quite
comfortable, to set aside funds in anticipation of the children’s
education, to improve the house and keep the mortgage payments up to
date.
Sometime in the early- to mid-1990s, things began to just
noticeably change in Bob’s and Barbara’s town. Fewer children
26

The remainder of this Part I is largely drawn from an article I published in
2004 titled Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information,
Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New Markets for Systemic-Income-RiskPricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy” in the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, now
called the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. See
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 214-18. All rights relating to this Part
of the Article reside with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, and I thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Law for allowing my use of this analogy and thereby facilitating the further
development of this field of scholarship.
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appeared to be being born there, and fewer still were staying or returning to town after graduating from university. The population was gradually aging, and more people seemed to be departing than moving in.
About the same time, a number of large, multi-department
retail stores and fast food establishments began to crop up on the
outskirts of the town, capitalizing upon national and even global
economies of scale (often, indeed, selling cheap imported goods from
developing countries). These stores tended to pay their employees—
first teenagers and retirees, then increasingly young and middle-aged
adults—lower wages in order to offer goods and services at yet cheaper
prices. These businesses attracted customers away from the charming
town square, and many of the independent, locally owned shops and
restaurants that once had brought in or paid living profits, salaries, or
wages and rendered that square so quaint and enjoyable began to
deteriorate or close. Barbara’s business was among those affected.
The new businesses tended to retain counsel from the larger
law firms located in the nearest metropolitan area, not Bob, when in
need of legal assistance. And, of course, there now were fewer in-town
clients requiring recourse to Bob’s particular portfolio of skills—skills
like contract and will drafting and so on—which Bob had developed
carefully and gradually with the local clientele’s needs in view. The
larger law firms, not all that surprisingly, also were uninterested in
what Bob might offer. He was no longer all that young, and, as noted
before, he had developed his capacities very much with a particular set
of needs—classic, small town needs—in view.
What is more, there were scores of younger lawyers, still
protean and not yet fully formed, pouring out of the law schools each
year. These folk generally preferred, and were more easily adaptable to,
the city lawyer’s life and work than was Bob. So even were Bob’s
livelihood the only thing that mattered to him or the only piper to
whose tune Bob had to dance, it is far from clear that he could simply
have changed his clientele and practice areas. Similar observations,
alas, hold of Barbara as well. The business acumen she first developed
at school and then honed at a local business or two, seemed to grow
less and less needed in the town’s steadily proliferating “big box”
stores.
On top of all this, even had Bob and his family been vocationally and temperamentally prepared to relocate to some place far
distant where Bob’s and Barbara’s abilities might have been more
marketable, they would in a sense still have been, in significant
measure, in other ways “locked-in” to their present place of residence.
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It is not simply that their lives, children, and traditions have been rooted
in their town now for decades.
It is, for one, that their children, well educable in the public
schools of their present town, would have to attend distant magnet or
expensive private schools in the larger city were the family to move,
and were they to hope that the children might continue developing their
minds and their sociabilities as well as they currently are doing. And it
is, at least as urgently, that Bob’s and Barbara’s parents, now up in
years, are in need of assistance and unlikely to live very much longer
should they themselves relocate. They might, of course, move to the
larger city with their children and their grandchildren, but this would
seem quite difficult to pull off. For a nursing home would be quite
expensive, not to say demoralizing.
So, of course, would a new home, given the decline in property
values in the hometown consequent on that town’s current economic
prospects, and the greater expense of a place in the city or its suburbs.
And Bob and Barbara would have to work farther from the home than
they do at present, and thus be unable to look in on their parents during
the day should the entire family take up residence in one large house.
It also seems unlikely that Bob and Barbara will be able to
afford so large a home as would be required by the latter prospect in
any event. For because their present town’s economic prospects are,
again, at least for the time being, on the wane, their own present
property value also has diminished markedly, while Bob and Barbara
remain contractually committed to making mortgage payments tied to
the home’s previous value. Their principal “nest egg,” then, is fully as
imperiled as are their sources of labor income, and for largely the same
reason.
Bob, Barbara, and family are increasingly in a bind. They are
going to have to make some very painful choices. And no matter what
choice they make, they are going to be significantly worse-off than they
used to be and, not unnaturally, expected by this point in their lives to
be.27

27

I could have made the story a bit more poignant by picturing Bob as, for
example, a steel or other industrial worker. In such cases his losses would be
even more dramatic, and more directly wrought by economic “globalization.” I
keep Bob as he is, however, in order to show that even less dramatic examples
closer to home give reason to consider markets such as I propose. Much of
what I say on behalf of Bob the small town lawyer could be said of Bob the
steel worker.
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Now, here are some questions. Could Bob and Barbara have
acted to prevent things coming to this pass? Was the whole scenario, in
the language of the law, reasonably foreseeable in the 1980s? Are Bob
and Barbara in any recognizable sense at fault for having relied, to their
detriment, upon things’ going largely as they’d gone for decades? Is
there anything, realistically speaking, that they could have done to
mitigate this, and is there now?
In light of our answers to the foregoing—particularly if we
answered “no”—is it just for Bob, Barbara, and theirs to suffer? Is it
welfare-efficient, for that matter, if, for example, someone else might
have willingly shared this risk with them, for a premium, had it not
been for the absence of any market in such risk? Would it not in any
event be more just and more efficient if such risk-trading opportunities
had been available, or if they were now? Well then, why aren’t they?
What we are envisaging in our story, of course, is a classic
social-insurance-implicative set of scenarios. Social insurance is meant
precisely to ease some of the “no fault” hardships and dislocations that
we find occasioned by sundry unforeseeable catastrophes and gradual
macroeconomic changes. Significantly, however, there is no form of
social insurance currently on offer in “developed” economies that fully
or near-fully addresses Bob’s and Barbara’s predicament.
Now, one way of looking at social insurance is as a surrogate
for missing markets. For familiar reasons that we shall get into a bit
more below, we do not currently find private insurance markets for the
trading or laying-off of risks like those now emerging for Bob and his
family—risks that could more efficiently be borne by more well-to-do
people than Bob and Barbara. Social insurance programs, administered
by governments possessed of authority over broad territorial expanses,
step in to fill some of the more dramatic of the resultant gaps, by
exploiting governmental powers to universalize risk pools and collect
compulsory premia in the form of taxes, and by their powers to
monitor, to some extent, insureds.
But there are well-known information costs and consequent
inefficiencies that attend such monitoring efforts.28 There also are
28

Concern with the difficulties of monitoring beneficiaries of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families payments, of course, prompted the “end to
welfare as we [knew] it.” Governor Bill Clinton, The New Covenant: Responsibility and Rebuilding the American Community (Oct. 23, 1991), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/
c24.txtp, archived at http://perma.cc/8WGD-LHMN. See also the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
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constant political pressures to exit the compulsory premium-paying risk
pools—i.e., to be let off the taxation or “mandate” hooks—exerted by
many who, often by Providence—e.g., inherited wealth—rather than
diligence, find themselves less subject to risk, even while less riskaverse, than others. The two sources of instability, of course, dovetail:
Opportunistic behavior by some who exploit the difficulties that attend
monitoring afford ammunition to the better-off who denigrate the
legitimacy of social insurance programs.
It is accordingly worthwhile asking whether, by both returning
to first principles and turning to new mathematical, legal, and
information technologies only recently to have become available and
still coming online, we might actually provide the heretofore missing
markets for which standard social insurance programs are offered as
coarse-grained and incomplete substitutes.
If we might, then we might supplement existing social
insurance programs with new forms of de facto social insurance—new
forms, indeed, of actually, literally, privately provided insurance. And
thus we might, by means not subject to the classic vulnerabilities of
traditional social insurance programs, spare Bob, his family, and many
like them much of their apparently unfairly and inefficiently borne
anguish. We might, that is, render the distribution of certain kinds of
risk both more efficient and more just in the bearing. I turn first, then,
to those advertised “first principles.” Then I will look to those
technologies and markets-soon-to-be. (I’ll get back to Barbara and Bob,
too.)
II.

Why We Should Work Toward a Happy Ending: Of Justice
and Insurance

The tale of Barbara and Bob as just told is a tale of both justice
and insurance. It is a tale of “life’s” being “unfair,” and of how we
collectively sometimes attempt, and yet fail, to render it more fair. The
reasons we fail, for their part, are reasons that sound in certain
structural impediments that bedevil our efforts. Insofar as these
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), through which President Clinton and Congress
expressed evident sympathy with Ronald Reagan’s concerns over an
apocryphal “welfare queen.” See Gene Demby, The Truth Behind the Lies of
the Original ‘Welfare Queen,’ NPR (Dec. 20, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.npr.
org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/12/20/255819681/the-truth-behind-the-lies-of-theoriginal-welfare-queen.
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impediments do this, they impede not only fairness, but efficiency as
well. For in the realm of insurance at least, justice and optimal
efficiency are by and large—not completely, but by and large—
coextensive.29
In this Part, I further explicate and, in so doing, substantiate
that claim. This should ultimately assist with the task of articulating just
why it is that we wish—and if possible ought—to do something for
Bob and Barbara. The strategy I’ll employ is to exploit certain close
structural parallels that subsist between justice and insurance. For
justice theory and insurance theory are, I shall argue, quite intimately
linked.30
It is somewhat surprising that the linkage I reference is not
more commonly remarked or systematically explored in the ethical or
economic literatures.31 For probably the best way to characterize the
remarkable progress made in justice theory since the mid-twentieth
century is as the gradually dawning—though still inchoate and
incomplete—recognition that justice itself is best understood as a kind
of insurance.32 And probably the best way to understand truly efficient
insurance, as I shall show, is as (nearly) distributively just riskallocation.33 I adopt and examine these perspectives in turn.
A.

Justice as Insurance

Justice is concerned with appropriate distributions of benefits
and burdens over persons.34 That suggests at least three constitutive
concerns of justice theory, each taking as a point of departure one of the
words I’ve just used.
First comes the word “appropriate.” That implicates what I call
the “pattern” or “formula” pursuant to which one’s account of justice

29

See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 195-96.
See id. at 184.
31
The subjects are at least considered together, even if in ultimately
unsatisfactory, fragmentary fashion, in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING
RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
32
See infra Part II.A; see also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 202.
33
See infra Part II.B; Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 195-96.
34
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1187;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 5 & n.14. For a
caveat about “persons,” see infra note 37.
30
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maintains that we ought to distribute.35 Next come the words “benefit”
and “burden.” Those implicate what I call the “distribuenda,” or
“objects of distribution,” that one’s account of justice takes for ethically
salient. 36 Finally comes the word “persons.” This implicates those
whom I call the “distribuees,” or “recipients” of benefits and burdens
that one’s account of justice takes for ethically salient.37
Justice theory has tended toward, and in my own work I
endeavor to complete, a convergence upon the following values as
those that best fill the variables just elaborated.38
1.

Distribution Formulae

First, the appropriate distribution formula seems to be that
which equalizes across persons such benefits and burdens as for which
we are not responsible, and to allow our outcomes therefore to vary
solely and precisely with such variable efforts as for which we are
responsible.39 While it can, of course, be difficult to sort between these
sources of well-faring and ill-faring in specific cases—conducting an
ethically critical process that I think of as “justice-accounting,” or
35

See infra Part II.A.1; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution,
supra note 22, at 1187; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15,
at 19.
36
See infra Part II.A.3; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution,
supra note 22, at 1220-58; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note
15, at 15.
37
See infra Part II.A.2; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution,
supra note 22, at 1216-19; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note
15, at 22-28. I don’t take a position here as to whether persons must be human,
whether they must be adult, whether they must be individuals rather than
collectivities such as ethnic groups or nation states, etc. For more on those
kinds of considerations, see Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra
note 22, at 1216-19.
38
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1318;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 93-94.
39
See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 58-59. Our
outcomes and our responsible efforts, of course, often will be mediated by some
form of recompense—“payment”—from others for those efforts. See Hockett,
Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1320-21. This conception of
justice therefore incorporates a role for social value—the valuing and disvaluing
by others of what we do or fail to do. See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3,
at 143. It is that mediation that renders this conception friendly to efficiency, as
further noted below. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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“responsibility-tracing”—as a rough and ready matter, the distinction
seems clear enough.40
This view of the appropriate distribution formula is sometimes
referred to as the “‘responsibility-tracking,’ or ‘luck’ egalitarian[]”
ideal.41 I prefer to call it “opportunity-egalitarian,” with the proviso that
opportunity must be understood in decidedly material, not just formal,
terms.42 “Opportunity” in this sense is roughly synonymous with
“exogenously given resource.”43
The guiding intuition on this understanding of justice is to
equalize “brute luck” or fortune over persons, while allowing differential diligence, including differential “option luck”—that is, fortune
consequent upon choices for which agents are responsible, such as the
outcomes of voluntarily undertaken gambles or insurance purchases—
to result in differential outcomes.44 We can think of this as a matter of
treating luck or fortune as what I call “ethically exogenous,” and
treating responsibility as what I call “ethically endogenous.”45
Please note the friendliness, on this conception, of justice to
efficiency—i.e., to the production, via what counts as “diligence,” of
social value, or “wealth.”46 Note its friendliness also, for much the
same reasons, to markets of certain sorts.
40

See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1296-99;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59.
41
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1259; see also
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 53.
42
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59.
43
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1238;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 25, 53; see also JOHN
E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 24 (1998); Richard J. Arneson,
Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 85 (1989);
Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 175-77 (1990); G. A. Cohen, On
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 916 (1989).
44
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1306-07.
45
Id. at 1219; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 38
n.62.
46
For more on “wealth” as efficiency, see of course J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 701 (1939); J. R. Hicks, The
Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105, 122 (1940); Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 549-50 (1939); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
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Distribuees

The opportunity-egalitarian view of the proper distribution
formula as just described dovetails with a view of distribuees as
responsible agents or active “subjects,” as distinguished from mere
patients or passive “objects.”47 We take the ethically relevant recipients
of benefits and burdens, for purposes of just distribution, to be “active
forgers” of parts of their fates rather than mere passive victims or
beneficiaries of fortuity or charity.48
The reason that this conception of distribuees dovetails with
the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula is that it only makes
sense to trace responsibility in our distribution formula if we view those
who receive distributions as being capable of responsibility.49 And that
is just what it is to call them responsible agents. Responsible agents’
well- or ill-faring is a function in part of what they do, and in part of
what they have.50 What they have in turn is itself partly attributable to
what they do, but also partly attributable to what they “are dealt.”51
The opportunity egalitarian ideal just is to equalize what agents
“are dealt,” while honoring—and holding them accountable in justice
for—what they “do.”52
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 124 (1979).
47
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1241-42;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-28.
48
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1241; see also
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-28.
49
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24.
50
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24.
51
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. Again, there is
no claim that these two “inputs” to well- or ill-faring are easily disentangled in
practice. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The claim is simply that
they are analytically distinguishable and ethically salient, which suggests in
turn that it is worth looking for means of separately tracing them in practice.
For proposals of such means, see generally ROEMER, supra note 43. See also
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1296-99; Hockett,
Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 52-59.
52
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1235-36;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 23-24. See also the
caveat registered supra note 51.
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Distribuenda

These views of appropriate distribution formulae and recipients of distribution dovetail with a view of the ethically salient
distribuenda—sometimes called the “currency” of justice53—as
ethically exogenous benefits and burdens, or material opportunities and
risks. We can also think of these as exogenously given resources in the
one case, and as handicaps or deficits in the other.54
Distribuees are responsible for making their own happiness of
their opportunities, which accordingly constitute a kind of “raw
material” or “resource” employed in the production of individual
“welfare.”55 Distribuees also are responsible for making additional
opportunities of such raw materials as they are dealt.56 Finally they also
are responsible for providing against and mitigating, so far as they are
able, such risks or harms as they are dealt.57 But, by definition, they are
not responsible for what they are not able to provide against or to
mitigate.58
4.

Distribution Mechanisms

Perhaps the best way to explicate more comprehensively the
linkage among distributive patterns, benefits and burdens, and
recipients is by reference to a particular mechanism that distributes the
right things to the right people in appropriate quantities. Please note, as
I proceed along these lines, how a fuller visualization of this sort begins
to suggest a specific institutional embodiment—an embodiment not
unlike that referenced earlier in introducing this essay and further
schematized below.59

53

See generally Cohen, supra note 43; see also Hockett, Deep Grammar of
Distribution, supra note 22, at 1234.
54
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1203;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 15-16.
55
Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1236; Hockett,
Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 26.
56
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1236;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 26.
57
See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 31-32.
58
See Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1219;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 81.
59
See infra Part IV.
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Intuitively, then, the simplest way simultaneously to equalize
ethically exogenous endowments on the one hand while holding people
responsible for the product of their ethically endogenous decisions on
the other would seem to be this: Afford everyone equal shares of
everything at time t0 and then both (a) allow them to trade toward
welfare-maximizing equilibria from those identical initial “baskets” of
resources, while (b) trading contingent compensatory claims upon one
another to provide against welfare-risks that can eventuate at any time
tn>0.60 (The mentioned risks are future contingencies about which all
have equal—in fact, no—knowledge and control at t0.)
Note how this mechanism embodies the opportunity-egalitarian understanding of appropriate distribution formula, distribuee, and
distribuenda just elaborated. The resources at t0 are ethically
exogenous—they’re “given”—hence they are equalized.61The trades
that are subsequently made are voluntarily made by responsible agents,
who are accordingly responsible for what they have after each of them.
Finally, because contingent claims-trading also can be done—pursuant
to which trading agents provide against unpleasant future contingencies
by foregoing present goods for future compensation should unpleasant
things occur—even some future, exogenously occurring misfortunes
now are “endogenized” in such a way as simultaneously enables
responsible agents to “take responsibility” for them and thereby
“become responsible” for them.62
Justice, then, on this view of distribuees, distribuenda, and
appropriate distribution formulae, is a kind of ongoing, life-long market
in goods, services, and insurance, the participants in which market are
equally endowed with knowledge and control over future contingencies. It is the ever-fluctuating outcome of an iterated set of fair
trades freely conducted by materially equally-situated parties,63 some of
whom are willing to purchase, at the price of consumption forgone
now, contingent future compensation from others, who themselves
perhaps prefer more consumption now, in the event that undesired
fortuities should occur later.

60

See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 74-78.
See supra notes 44-45.
62
See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 25-26.
63
Please bear in mind that “equally” here pertains only to the ethically
exogenous, endowment-originating portion of one’s holdings, pursuant to the
“luck-egalitarian” conception described above. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
61
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William Vickrey, John Harsanyi, and other “veiled” utilitarians
evidently were groping toward some such image as this.64 The “veil of
ignorance”65 that they used to justify utilitarian distribution principles
was in essence a contrived equalization of the informational and
resource endowment, under which circumstance, these thinkers
thought, parties all “would” purchase the utilitarian “policy,” i.e., the
aggregate- or average-utility-maximizing distribution formula.66
John Rawls essentially did the same thing, but imputed a
different choice of distribution formula, namely the “difference
principle” as implemented via the maximin formula, pursuant to which
the prospects of the least well off would trump those of everyone else.67
In both cases the imputations entailed, in effect, attributions of extreme
attitudes toward risk to the “insurers”—Rawls an extreme aversion to
risk, Harsanyi et al. an extreme foolhardiness toward the same.68
Ronald Dworkin, more exactingly, thought through the likely
choices of insurers on the basis of behavior observable in actual
insurance markets—the insurance metaphor at last was recognized
explicitly and taken seriously—but again the choices were, in the final
64

See generally, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics
and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434 (1953)
[hereinafter Cardinal Utility]; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309
(1955) [hereinafter Cardinal Welfare]; William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and
Social Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1960).
65
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999).
66
In the 1953 paper, Harsanyi “proved” that agents conforming to the axioms
of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory would agree to
maximize aggregate utility. See generally Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility, supra
note 64. In the 1955 paper, he “proved” that they would agree to maximize
average utility. See generally Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, supra note 64.
67
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72-73 (rev. ed. 1999); see also Hockett,
Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1202.
68
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW & LEONID HURWICZ, STUDIES IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION PROCESSES 463-71 (1977) (finding that maximin scores a perfect
“1” on the pessimism index); GEOFFREY A. JEHLE & PHILIP J. RENY,
ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY 260 (2d ed. 2001); Kenneth J. Arrow,
Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL.
245, 256-57 (1973) (book review); John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory,
69 AM POL. SCI. REV. 594, 595-96 (1975). One might say that Rawls’s
distribuees are effectively treated as implausibly risk-averse, while Harsanyi’s
distribuees were effectively treated as implausibly risk-cavalier.
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analysis, imputed.69 “One size” was selected to “fit all.” And though,
presumably, it did fit more, there must of course be many whom the
garment does not clothe.70
This invites an obvious question: What if we could offer
actual, rather than imputed, choices to our agents as self-insurers?
Might we get our sizing straight? Might we offer actual insurance that
works the same justice-magic as the likes of Vickrey, Harsanyi, Rawls,
and Dworkin seemed to sense intuitively it might?
Before turning to that prospect, I’d like to examine the justice/
insurance relation from the other—the insurance—side of the disciplinary divide. For this will both further illuminate the underlying unity of
justice and insurance, and take us more readily appreciably back,
through examination of the current practice of insurance, to the
concrete reality faced by Bob and his family above in Part I.
B.

Insurance as Justice

Insurance is a means of pooling, generally through market
exchange, broad classes of risk, the eventuation of which, in relation to
the pool’s risk-bearers as a whole, are reasonably affordable, while in
relation to all or most risk-bearers taken as individuals, are not.71
Herewith, of course, is the source of insurance’s capacity to both
effectuate and allocate risk-bearing more efficiently.72
69

Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283, 314-23 (1981).
70
See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Dworkin, supra note 69; see also
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2000) (reprinting previous two articles and subsequent writing). In
comparison to Rawls and Harsanyi as characterized supra note 68 and
accompanying text, one might say that Dworkin’s imputed choices are more
carefully argued, attempting to get things “just right.” But I argue here that a
better answer is, if possible, simply to leave-off imputing choices altogether,
and make a serious effort at affording actual choice.
71
See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 184-85.
72
One can hardly improve upon the venerable Adam Smith in this context:
“The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private people,
and by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an individual,
makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society.” 5 ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 281
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
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If each of us is a farmer, each has a barn upon which his
livelihood depends, and each of us stands a one in one hundred chance
of losing his barn to a fire, most of us will be tempted to save much
more than one-hundredth of the replacement cost of a barn given how
much each depends on his barn. We will thus set aside in aggregate
much more than the actuarial value of the risk we collectively face.73 If
on the other hand we can pool risk together, we’ll set aside no more
than that actuarial value, and each of us will chip-in merely one onehundredth of the cost of a barn.74
That’s one of the senses in which insurance brings greater
efficiency—in effect solving a collective action problem and thereby
minimizing aggregate (“social”) cost.75 The other sense is this: If some
of those in the hypothetical are more risk-welcoming than others, they
will be willing to cover the risk of lost barns for less compensation than
will others.76 If an insurance market facilitates or simulates sale of that
“covering” service by the risk-welcoming to the risk-fearing, then we
will yet further minimize aggregate (“social”) cost. For risk will be
borne by those most ready and least expensively able to bear it.
1.

Prerequisites to Efficient Insurance

Now, the very characterization just offered implicitly carries
three well-known prerequisites to efficiently operating, long-termsustainable insurance markets. As we shall see, moreover, with one
caveat, the same practical measures as ensure that those prerequisites
are met actually facilitate a just, not only an efficient, distribution of
risk.77 Practically efficient insurance and just risk-distribution, in other
words, are near extensional equivalents.

73

Cf. Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1250.
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 185.
75
Id.
76
Cf. Hockett, Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 22, at 1273
(“[T]here is a host of institutions . . . all of which exist, in part, to facilitate the
transfer of risk from those less willing to bear it to those who are more
willing.”).
77
See infra Part II.B.2.
74
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Event Independence

First, then, insured events must be what we call “independent
of,” or “orthogonal to,” one another.78 For risk-pooling to work, risk
must actually eventuate for but a small fraction, at most, of the risk
pool.79 The ex ante “probability of an insured event’s befalling one
prospective member of the risk pool” must therefore be orthogonal to its
befalling another such prospective member.80 Wavelike, catastrophic,
covarying events (within the pool) generally are not insurable.81
To recur to the barn story, if the barns are all near one another
such that one barn’s burning will likely occasion every barn’s burning,
there is no way for our barn-owners to insure among themselves. For
there will be no unaffected farmer able to subsidize the affected
farmer(s) in rebuilding after the blaze.
b.

Event Estimatability

Second, insured events must be what we call “determinable”
and “estimatable,” or “priceable.”82 The insured event first must be
well defined, its occurrence readily verified, so that we know with
reasonable certainty when it has transpired.83 And then the probability
and cost—”probable cost”—of the event’s eventuation must also be
more or less ascertainable ex ante.84 Otherwise we don’t know quite
what we’re insuring, how to know when payouts are due, or of course
what to pay out or, therefore, assess in the way of premia ex ante.85
78

See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 186-87.
See id. at 187.
80
See id.
81
See, e.g., KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 163-74 (Knut K.
Aase & Agnar Sandmo eds., 1990); J. FRANCOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 132-33 (1998); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 43 (11th ed. 2014);
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 187; see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL
ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 167-208, 436-73 (1995); DAVID M. KREPS,
A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71-124, 577-715 (1990); HAL R.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 172-94 (3d ed. 1992).
82
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 187-88.
83
Id. at 188.
84
Id. at 187-88.
85
See, e.g., OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN,
supra note 81, at 42; see also KENNETH J. ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and
79
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Event-Informational Symmetry

Finally, information among prospective insurers and insureds
must be more or less what we call “symmetrically” distributed.86 (Note
the cross-resonance between “symmetry” here and “equality” when
speaking of justice above.87) Insurer and insured must be, in other
words, more or less equally informationally endowed with respect to
the salient risk that is being insured against.88
There are two commonly remarked vitiating consequences of
asymmetrically distributed information. Please note the ethically
pregnant, justice-resonant language of the two terms of art that we
commonly employ in naming these consequences.
One such consequence is that known as “adverse (or “anti-”)
selection.”89 Where the insured is positioned to know more about the
probability of the insured event’s occurrence than is the insurer,
insurers come to fear selection-bias on the part of those seeking

Resource Allocation, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 77, 84-85 (1984) [hereinafter Insurance, Risk,
and Resource Allocation]; KREPS, supra note 81, at 661-79; MAS-COLELL ET
AL., supra note 81, at 460-67; VARIAN, supra note 81, at 42-45; 180-81.
Note that we can sum-up the requirements stated in Part II.B.1.a-b as
follows: It is a commonplace that the insurance premium P for insured event
i—Pi –must be equal to the probability of the insured event’s occurring—πi—
multiplied by the loss that will thereby be occasioned—Li—and by an
administrative cost—a. In short, Pi = (1+a)πiLi. Now if the probability of the
event’s occurring is certain, such that πi = 1, then Pi = (1+a)Li, and the
premium exceeds the loss. If πi is unknown, on the other hand, there will be no
Pi at all.
86
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 189.
87
See supra Part II.A.
88
See, e.g., BORCH, supra note 81, at 315-30; KREPS, supra note 81, at 625650; MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 437-50; OUTREVILLE, supra note
81, at 166-67; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 42-45; VARIAN,
supra note 81, at 466-70; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and
Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1974); Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk
Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments, GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC., June 1978, at 5, 6; Michael
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 648
(1976).
89
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 189.
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insurance.90 Expecting the worst, they accordingly charge higher
premia or withdraw from the market altogether.91 Familiar expressions
such as “Gresham’s Law” (“bad [risks] drive[] out the good”), the
“market for lemons,” and the like all allude to circumstances in which
adverse selection is operative.92
The other archetypal information asymmetry situation is that
involving so-called “moral hazard.”93 (The ethical valence of the idea
could not be more clearly conveyed.) Here the insured not only better
knows or is able to conceal the relevant probability that determines the
actuarial value or disvalue of the insured event, but is able actually to
manipulate or affect it.94 Insureds might, for example, slacken efforts to
avoid risk’s eventuation, or even act to bring it about, owing to
potentially perverse incentive effects of insurance itself.95

90

Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 190.
92
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970). For a more general and
formal discussion, see generally Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid,
Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously
Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
To recur to the formulaic treatment at supra note 85, efficiency also
“requires” that, for persons 1 & 2, Pi1 > Pi2 if πi1 > πi2. But if all pay Pi2,
then there will be insufficient supply, while if all must pay Pi1, there will be
insufficient demand.
93
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 190.
94
See, e.g., ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, supra note 85,
at 85; BORCH, supra note 81, at 325-30; OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 13334, 179-80; J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and
Information—An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375, 1389-91
(1979); see generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968).
In terms of the formulaic summation at supra note 85, moral hazard
brings about a state in which πi = 1, or at any rate in which πi > Pi/(1+a)L,
such that the premium exceeds the loss and thus renders the market impossible
to maintain.
95
Such was of course a principal reason offered for Congress’s passage of the
PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). It’s as if they were thinking of Reagan’s
apocryphal “welfare queen.” See Demby, supra note 28.
91
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Methods for Meeting the Prerequisites:
Optimizing is Fairness-Restoring

There are several commonly employed practical means—some
introduced by insurers and permitted by law, others afforded more
directly by the law itself—of ensuring that the three prerequisites to
efficient insurability obtain. Note that, with one critical exception, the
same means as render insurance efficient render risk-distribution more
just.
a.

Pool-Universalizing and
Behaviorally Risk-Segmenting

Event independence is optimized in two ways. First, we
broaden—ideally, we universalize—the risk pool.96 The broader the
pool, the lesser the likelihood of covariance.97 Also, however, the
broader the pool, the more just the risk distribution—at least if the
insured event is ethically exogenous, such that no one is responsible for
its occurrence. Second, and partly because of that last observation, we
separate-off—we “segment,” or “classify”—risks that we come in time
to recognize consistently to co-vary, i.e., to be “caused” in their
eventuation by, known “risk-factors.”98 The progress of knowledge,
then, tends over time to bring progress to insurance.99
96

See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 191.
Id. at 191-92.
98
See id. at 196 & n.205.
99
See OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note
81, at 36. Universalizing of this sort, incidentally, is precisely what the socalled “Obamacare mandate” is meant to do. It works to render American
health insurance simultaneously more just and efficient by roping everyone
into the risk pool, such that we cross-subsidize one another as justice would
mandate and efficiency would require. For more on this, see generally Hockett,
Making Sense, supra note 6.
Broader pooling also improves estimatability, through the operation
of the “law of large numbers.” See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at
36; infra Part II.B.2.b. On risk-classification, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY
L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 1618 (1999); OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 150-51. See generally Kenneth S.
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Classification, 71 VA. L. REV.
403 (1985). Formally, discovery of more fine-grained “statistical or microstatistical (‘causal’) relations between subfeatures γ and δ of events Γ and Δ, for
97
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Now note that universalizing the risk pool, at least with respect
to truly exogenous—unavoidable—risks, is precisely what would be
mandated by justice.100 Note also that separating-off risks that are,
through responsible or diligent behavior, avoidable or mitigable also is
mandated by justice.101 Universalizing the pool of ethically exogenous
risk-bearing is mandated by justice’s luck-equalizing imperative, while
segmenting ethically endogenous, fault-worthy risk-incurring is
mandated by justice’s responsibility-tracing imperative.102
Now note as well that our law tends to authorize—in some
cases even to mandate—his form of segmentation. There are few if any
legal restrictions upon so-called “bonus/malus” premium structuring
(again, please note the morally charged connotation of this insurance
term of art).103 There is no legal impediment, in other words, to pricing
pursuant to which, e.g., unsafe drivers or smokers are charged more by
the insurance industry.104 Note also that the one form of risksegmentation that would offend justice—segmenting on the basis of
ineluctable traits—often, though perhaps not often enough(!), tends to
be regarded with suspicion by the law. The classic case here is the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of genetic information by
health insurers and employers.105
example, will render the degree of covariance between Γ and Δ more
predictable; one might, upon such discovery, find that [Γ\ γ and Δ\ δ] can be
separately insured because it is only γ and δ that covary.” Hockett, Just
Insurance, supra note 3, at 191-92. That is, entire classes of such subfeatures
might indeed be separately insurable. See id.
100
See supra Part II.A.
101
See supra Part II.A.
102
See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
103
See BORCH, supra note 81, at 299-300.
104
See id.
105
It will then simulate “leveling down”—prohibiting, in the idiom of supra
note 99 the use of certain subclasses of “Γ\ γ and Δ\ δ” information. See
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99. On risk-classification, see
supra note 98-99 and accompanying text. On its injustice in the genetic
informational context, see generally, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM
CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 1994);
Kenneth J. Arrow, Medical Information and Medical Insurance: An Ethical
Dilemma? (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). On the
(il)legality of risk-classification predicated on genetic information, see
generally, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L.
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Pool-Universalizing and Learning

Turning from event independence to determinability and
probable cost estimatability, these too are affected, as is event
independence, by the advancement of scientific knowledge and the
broadening of risk pools, both of which phenomena go significantly
hand in hand.106 Broadening the risk pool tends to result in
standardization of contracts, liquidity in the insurance market, and
sharpening of the definitions of insured events.107 It also tends to
“incentivize” the collection of additional data on the precise causes and
likelihoods of insured events’ eventuation.108
Now note that precisely the same means tend to facilitate what
I call the “justice-accounting” implicitly required by the opportunityegalitarian ideal in justice theory.109 That ideal requires careful tracing
of the results of, and thus of the precise boundary line between, what is
ethically exogenous and beyond control or anticipation on the one
hand, and what is ethically endogenous and within our ken and capacity
on the other.110 Learning more over time about what factors tend to
cause what harms against which we wish to insure enables us to also
better determine, over time, what people can do—hence what they can
subsequently be held responsible for doing—to minimize their own
risks.111
c.

Mandatory Disclosure and
Simulated Shared Opacity

Turning finally to symmetric information, this is, in the
insurance context—where neither insureds nor insurers have conferred
ethically endogenous benefits upon one another such as would warrant
a departure from the ethically exogenous equality baseline—simply
equally shared information.112 The methods typically employed to
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C).
106
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 192.
107
See id.
108
See, e.g., OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 132-33; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN,
supra note 81, at 36.
109
See supra text accompanying note 40.
110
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
111
See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 192-93.
112
See id. at 189, 192-93.
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combat the effects of asymmetric information and thus render insurance
efficiently providable, accordingly, also tend to render informationand risk-distribution more just.
There are two broad classes of such methods—what we might
call “leveling-up” and “leveling-down.”113 These too have emerged
from insurance practice and the law alike. Leveling-up is effected by
means of transparency rules—e.g., rights to pre-inspection,114 or the
“disclose” component of the SEC’s “disclose or abstain” reading of
Rule 10b-5.115 Leveling-down is effected by means of what I call
“simulated shared opacity”116—e.g., express or implied warranties,
preexisting condition clauses,117 or the “abstain” component of the
SEC’s aforementioned reading of Rule 10b-5.118 Simulated shared
opacity also is, of course, simply the imposition of a “veil of ignorance,” our friend from justice theory mentioned above.119
Note that “leveling-up” methods tend to enhance both justice
and efficiency.120 Only “leveling-down” methods might be thought to
diminish, to some extent, efficiency conceived as wealth-maximization
in some contexts.121 It must be stressed in this connection, however,
that the effect here would tend to be ambiguous, in light of both (a) the

113

Id. at 199-200.
See, e.g., VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 18, 135; Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 962 (1963). On legal doctrines, see Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C). Note that “preexisting
condition” clauses covering genetic traits might offend justice. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-53(c) (2012).
115
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2014).
116
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99.
117
See, e.g., ARROW, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, supra note 85,
at 84-85; BORCH, supra note 81, at 319; OUTREVILLE, supra note 81, at 15052; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 81, at 354, 586. See generally Kenneth
J. Arrow, Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles, 74 SCANDINAVIAN
ACTUARIAL J. 1 (1974).
118
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 198-99.
119
See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
120
Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 200.
121
Id.
114
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ethical irrelevance of wealth produced by unjust means122 and (b) the
demoralization and/or resentment effects that injustice can bring.123
(For example, a commonly offered efficiency-justification for the
SEC’s “disclose or abstain” rule is that participants will withdraw from,
hence deliquify and render less efficient, a market that they think
unfair.124)
So we see that, from the insurance side of the justice/insurance
dyad just as surely as from the justice side, risk-distributive justice and
efficient insurance can be seen to be by and large co-extensive. And
from the insurance side, we begin to get a glimmer of the very concrete,
practical means that might be employed to render the distribution of at
least one distribuendum—risk—both more just and more efficient. This
takes us back to Bob and Barbara.
III.

The Injustice and Inefficiency in Our Earlier Story: All for
Want of Insurance125

Back to Bob and Barbara. So suppose now that Bob and
Barbara had wished somehow to insure, back in the late 1980s or early
1990s as they began their careers, against what is now befalling them
and their family. Of course, the unavailability of such insurance as we
shall discuss would render it somewhat surprising for Bob or Barbara
122

See Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe, supra note 22, at 412;
Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare, supra note 22, at 25 n.44; Hockett, Taking
Distribution Seriously, supra note 15, at 31.
123
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 1 (expanded ed.
1997) (“That a perceived sense of inequity is a common ingredient of rebellion
in societies is clear enough . . . .”).
124
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, On the Moral Structure of White Collar
Crime, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319 (2007).
125
Parts III-V again draw from my article Just Insurance Through Global
Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New
Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading
in a “New Economy.” See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 218-33,
238-56. As explained previously, though, my work in Just Insurance was more
formal and technical. See supra text accompanying note 4. Here, on the other
hand, I intend to make the conclusions of Just Insurance in a more accessible
manner, supra text accompanying note 4, and thus the degree to which the
present language traces the language in Just Insurance will vary. Again, I
thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law and
reiterate its retention of the rights relating to this material.
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even to consider it. The imaginative space in which demands are
formed is itself partly a function of what already is supplied—invention
often mothers perceived necessity much as necessity mothers invention. But ignore that for the moment. The question here is, why is there
in fact no supply of such insurance as Bob and Barbara might use even
for them so much as to imagine or begin to exploit?
A.

Inefficient Because the Prerequisites Aren’t Met

The reasons are rooted in those prerequisites to efficient
insurance rehearsed just above.126
1.

Local Income and Home Price Covariance

Many of the principal sources of income- and asset-value-loss
to people like Bob and Barbara give rise to classic covariance
problems. Those include sectoral, regional, or general macroeconomic
downturns or obsolescence, associated demographic trends, and so on
as described in connection with Bob’s and Barbara’s value-added, their
particular occupations, their home-valuation, and so on, as described in
Part I. Unless Bob and Barbara can access a risk-pool well beyond their
local and vocational environments, then, their insurance potential will
be quite limited.127 For their neighbors and colleagues likely are
suffering many of the same losses as they are suffering.
2.

Extended-Event Nonpriceability

Insured event determinability and probable cost estimatability
also are problematic in Bob’s and Barbara’s case. With respect to
126

See supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION
AND RISK SHARING 136 (1994) (“Most individual[‘s] primary asset is their
human capital. This is subject to significant fluctuations in value as industries
grow and decline. . . . Those people who have nontransferable skills have
suffered a large uninsured capital loss.”); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING 258-59 (1985) (discussing the extent to which labor is
nondiversifiable); Donald F. Gordon, A Neo-classical Theory of Keynesian
Unemployment, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 431, 443 (1974) (“One cannot . . . sell a
piece of oneself if one is a lawyer in Cincinnati and buy a portion of a
carpenter in San Diego.”).
127
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determinability, notice that the would-be insured event is not some
singular, salient, dramatic, one-off affair—e.g., a fire or death—such as
might easily be individuated and verified in the occurrence. It is a
multifactorial, protracted affair, rather like the case of the proverbial
frog in the gradually heating water.
As for probable cost estimatability, the cost factor is not
terribly difficult—it’s simply the lost income or asset-value—but
probability is a different story. In the absence of careful trend-watching
over a lengthy period, the results of which watching are readily
accessible both to would-be insurers and to Barbara and Bob, the risk
here is going to be quite indefinite as a matter of magnitude. At least
that is so ex ante, which is of course the relevant temporal perspective
from the point of view of insurance.
Were a market for such insurance already to exist and be
highly liquid, there would of course be incentives for the ferreting-out
and publication—at least in the form of observable prices impounding
it—of such information. There might, in other words, be “price
discovery.” But there is not yet such a market. Another case, then, this
one—like supply and demand—of “chicken and egg.”
3.

Classic Information Asymmetry

The asymmetric information problems in our story are even
worse than the covariance and non-priceability problems. Bob’s and
Barbara’s prospective insurer, had they approached her in hopes of
purchasing a policy covering what is now happening to them, would
have been apt to wonder whether Bob and Barbara knew something
that she did not. After all, that insurer would, in view of the observation
made just above, have to be located, or have access to many others
located, outside of Bob’s locality, and probably wouldn’t be a small
town lawyer. So Bob is of course better situated than his prospective
insurer to know what his town’s and his practice’s long term prospects
are. And the prospective insurer will know this. So that prospective
insurer, recognizing a possible adverse selection bias, will be reluctant
to insure Bob.
The moral hazard problem is yet more acute, at least with
respect to Bob’s and Barbara’s incomes and perhaps to some extent
even with respect to the value of their home. After all, if the insurance
policy is drafted in terms of income and home valuation alone—which
it will have to be, absent a readily accessed locus of more “macro”oriented, fluctuating data such as small town lawyers’ income trends
and small town homes’ valuational trends more generally—what is to
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keep Bob’s and Barbara’s incomes or home value from dropping
simply owing to their own negligence? Our prospective insurer faces a
classic moral hazard risk, the monitoring against which will likely be
prohibitively expensive both as a legal and as a logistical matter.128
B.

Unjust Because Inefficient: What Impedes
Insurance Impedes Fairness as Well

Notice that a private market for insurance against Bob’s and
Barbara’s fate, apparently rendered impossible by the factors just
rehearsed, is missing through no fault of Bob’s, Barbara’s, or their
prospective insurer’s. Bob and Barbara are perfectly honest and
diligent, their prospective insurer presumably ready to insure them, up
to a point, if only she can trust them and her own powers of assessing
likely risks such as those that faced Bob and Barbara, then quite
remotely, in the later 1980s or early 1990s.129
Our insurer, who either bets directly on people like Bob and
Barbara or pools risks faced by many diverse people together as a
financial intermediary, is a person of good will who is presumptively—
because she is an insurer—much better able to cover risks like Bob’s
and Barbara’s than are Bob and Barbara, if, again, she only can trust
them and feel relatively confident about the verifiability and real
probable cost of their possible misfortunes. Moreover, were she able to
be reimbursed by Bob and Barbara were their prospects to improve
after initially dropping and bringing them an insurance payout—e.g.,
after a popular “communitarian” movement and disillusionment with
metropolitan life begins to take people back to the towns—she might
be even more willing to insure Bob and Barbara.
It begins to look as though all that is really missing here, then,
is not good will or a willingness to trade risks from those less
efficiently to those more efficiently able to bear them. It is, rather,
certain critical forms of information and a critical mass of prospective
participants who, were they to be made vividly aware of the
possibilities, would be willing themselves to constitute a market such as
128

See supra notes 28, 95 and accompanying text (discussing concerns raised
in connection with Congress’s passage of the PRWORA).
129
It is critical that we keep the temporal perspective in mind. We now have
“20/20 hindsight” with respect to Bob himself. The present project is
concerned more directly with the Bobs of the future, whom we cannot now
readily identify, in order that they might avoid Bob’s quandary when things
begin to unfold for them as they have done for Bob.
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would begin to “incentivize” both the generation and the institutional
concentration and deployment of that needed information. (“Chicken
and egg” again.) What we have here, in other words, is perhaps in
crucial part a classic problem of inertia and collective action, predicated
upon a set of long-settled informational expectations.
Patterns of expectation as to what is possible and what is not
have developed around long-enduring—up to now—understandings of
what is technologically feasible, in both an informational and in a legal
sense, and what is not. We are accustomed to thinking of information
such as bears upon Bob’s and Barbara’s income and wealth prospects
as the sort of stuff that is gathered, if at all, only with long periodicity,
and which is, again, if gathered at all, dispersed over varied,
disconnected sites that do not “talk” to one another.
Perhaps some government office keeps some of the
information—e.g., home value trends from decade to decade. Perhaps
the labor department keeps other bits of it—e.g., lawyers’ income
trends from 15-year period to 15-year period. Perhaps the ABA keeps
yet other bits—e.g., trends in profitable legal practice areas measured in
20-year increments.
And the legal forms taken by our transactions tend to reflect
those settled expectations: We insurance-contract over singular, highly
salient, one-off type events—events generally involving one or a fairly
small number of persons, not many people, and taking place at one
time, not over protracted periods. Paid insureds do not typically point to
countless others in order to verify what has happened to them, or “give
the money back” to insurers when their continuously unfolding
fortunes gradually pick up for the better.
But technological feasibility—in both the informational and
legal senses—has changed: It is now possible, quickly and repeatedly
over time, to gather, amass and centrally locate all manner of data
bearing upon peoples’ wealth-prospects in a manner previously unimagined. And legal technology has kept pace with information
technology: New kinds of contracts are continually being designed,
such as enable people to take opposite sides of transactions on the basis
of information that is of differential value-import to the counterparties.
If the only thing standing in the way of exploiting these new
technologies in order to supply currently missing markets is inertia or
collective action challenge—everybody waiting for the others to act—
then we might, quite simply, realize terrific Pareto gains—everyone
made better off—if we can but jump-start, collectively, the instituting
of such markets. And if the understanding of justice offered above
holds, according to which most of Bob’s and Barbara’s sufferings were
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not reasonably foreseeable, hence not chargeable to their “diligence
account,” and are in that sense undeserved, then the supply of such
markets will represent, not only a substantial Pareto gain, but a critical
justice gain.
Let us now then visualize, a bit more concretely, the sort of
instruments and markets that might be of benefit to Bob, Barbara, and
those like them—indeed, to all of us who participate in “developed”
economies.
IV.

Building Better Betting Markets: Wealth-, Income-, and
Other Insurance for Barbara and Bob

Let’s see, now, whether we might devise privately tradable
social insurance by tying micro-insurance policies to macro-aggregates.
Were we able to do that, we might enable a simultaneously more just
and efficient distribution of risks over our population.
A.

Three New Sample “Democratized” Derivatives

Picture, then, if you would, a new kind of hedging instrument
and a new kind of market in such instruments. These instruments and
markets are not fanciful extensions of current markets in exotic
derivative securities. They simply are designed more with people like
Bob and Barbara, rather than large conglomerate firms with
Gargantuan portfolios of “value at risk,” in view.
1.

A “Small Practice Lawyer’s Income”
Collar

Assume the existence, for the moment, of an index of small
practice lawyer income. Perhaps the ABA, perhaps the Labor
Department, perhaps the IRS, perhaps some other institution tracks
incomes of lawyers engaged in small private practice, aggregates them,
and expresses them in terms of some arbitrarily-selected base year, as is
familiarly done with the GDP, the CPI, and other such aggregate.
Now imagine that we design a contract, either between Bob
and some financial intermediary which pools the savings and riskprovisions of multiple parties, or between Bob and some other
counterparty from whom he purchases the contract on an organized
exchange. The contract provides that, whenever at the end of some
predetermined period—say a half-year, a month, or a week—the index
rises above some pre-determined level, Bob must direct a payment

644

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 34

toward that intermediary. And it provides that, whenever the index falls
below some pre-determined level, the intermediary directs a payment
toward Bob.
The “collar,” is, of course, analyzable in familiar derivative
terms as the simultaneous sale of a call option and purchase of a put
option on revenue generated by an asset.130 Here the “asset” simply is
the index tracking Bob’s occupational prospects. Now Bob and his
counterparties are of course required to maintain margin accounts with
the intermediary or the broker on the envisaged exchange to guaranty
performance. If clearing is effected frequently—e.g., daily per the
“marked to market” system—the margin accounts need not be prohibitively large.
We can do much the same thing, of course, with Barbara’s
income if we construct the right index. We might thereby construct,
say, a “Small Business Accountant’s Income” Collar, or a “Small
Business Executive Officer’s Income” Collar, or what have you. At
present there are few obvious limitations on what we might construct.
2.

A “Small Town Domestic Product” Collar

Imagine the instrument just described, but now with the
pertinent index tracking the economic performance of Bob’s and
Barbara’s town or of small towns more generally, suitably defined.
When the index rises, Bob and Barbara pay out. When the index falls,
their counterparties pay in.
3.

A “Regional (or Small Town) Real Estate
Value” Collar

Now think as before, but in this case with the relevant index
tracking real estate values in the pertinent area or of the pertinent—e.g.,
“small town”—type. Again, Bob and Barbara pay out or receive payins, which vary countercyclically with the performance of the aggregate
130

Collar instruments have been proposed for the protection of returns on
retirement investment accounts. See, e.g., Zvi Bodie, Financial Engineering
and Social Security Reform, in RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM 291, 303-04 (John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein eds.,
2001); Martin Feldstein & Elena Ranguelova, Accumulated Pension Collars:
A Market Approach to Reducing the Risk of Investment-based Social Security
Reform, 15 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 149, 152 (2001); Gordon, supra note 7, at
1564 & n.143.
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to which his net worth is tied. Bob’s and Barbara’s cyclical net worth is
“smoothed,” “collared.” They surrender some “upside” gains in return
for lessening their “downside” losses. Their counterparties do the same.
B.

Yet More Definable Risks, Yet More Democratized
Derivatives

We can imagine many other such instruments. We can imagine
parceling data in all manner of ways, all with a view to tying the
aggregate of prospects upon which Bob and Barbara in effect “bet”
more closely to the prospects of returns upon their human capital, their
social capital (that of their town), their real property, and so on—in
sum, to their full net worth. More such instruments will allow for a
more “granularly” customized, more fully optimized, portfolio. There
is, in effect, a sort of “contingent-consol-swap,”131 an iterated, ongoing
bet between the parties in all of these cases.132 There is in this sense
continuous, efficient, and, because it is voluntary, just risk-sharing.
131

“Swaps” are of course agreements pursuant to which parties entitled to
particular income-streams trade those rights. See, e.g., GORDON J. ALEXANDER
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTING 405-10 (3d ed. 2001). “Consols” are
perpetual annuities not often found in the U.S. but rather more familiar in
Great Britain. Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 3, at 225 & n.255.
132
The notion of an aggregate-associated hedging instrument, in this case a socalled “macro” security, appears to have first been discussed in print by John
F. Marshall et al., Hedging Business Cycle Risk with Macro Swaps and
Options, 4 CONT’L BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 103 (1992). Marshall
elaborates in John F. Marshall, Derivatives and Risk Management, in THE
NEW TOOL SET: ASSESSING INNOVATIONS IN BANKING 79, 83 (1995).
The idea is implicit, of course, in the failed attempt, prior to the stock
market crash of October 1987, to market a CPI-derivative instrument. See
Brian R. Horrigan, The CPI Futures Market: The Inflation Hedge That Won’t
Grow, BUS. REV., May-June 1987, at 3, 4. The market crash itself and
subsequent attenuation of inflationary threat might account for the failure of
this market. See id. at 4-5. A similar story, also involving regulatory uncertainty, unfolded in the case of another early consumer macro-derivative, the
S&P-indexed CD. See generally Joseph P. Ogden, A Strategic Analysis of
Stock Index-Linked CDs, in DERIVATIVES, REGULATION AND BANKING 193
(Barry Schachter ed., 1997).
The principal champion of markets in instruments tied to macroindices over the past two decades has surely been my mentor Robert Shiller.
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 98 (2012);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY
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In so far as there are willing counterparties, these effective
“swaps” of asset-value-streams will, by definition, result in welfare
gains for all. And insofar as they enable Bob and Barbara to mitigate
the ravages of fortune over which they lack control, they will result
both in justice gains with respect to risk-allocation, and in
chargeability, through their “diligence accounts,” of Bob and Barbara
both with some degree of responsibility to insure and with some degree
of “constructive knowledge”—in the form of securities prices—of the
likely longer term income-consequences of his choices. Let’s particularize those observations a bit more, by reference to the prerequisites to
just and efficient insurance described just above.
C.

How the “Democratized” Derivative Instruments
Avoid the Usual Impediments to Just and Efficient
Insurance

Now note how these instruments and markets address the three
classic insurance problems:
1.

Randomizing Covariance

The instruments just pictured pair parties who are differently
situated—people whose prospects are likely to counter-vary to one
degree or another. We can enumerate all manner of pair and n-tuple of
full or partial complements and substitutes within economies, countervarying regional or national economic performances themselves (Japan
and Germany versus the US and UK, for example), and other magnitudes the varying of which will be tied to one degree or another with
one’s net worth.
Non-small-practice lawyers, for example, hoping to hedge
their own income risks, are likely to be among Bob’s counterparties—
they and Bob will in effect insure one another, each faring better when
the other fares worse, and each directing payments to the others
precisely when those others are more needful and they themselves less.
Likewise, Bob’s non-small-town-dwelling counterparties, and so on.

122-23 (2003); ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS, at v (1993)
[hereinafter MACRO MARKETS]. See generally Hockett, Just Insurance, supra
note 3, composed while I was one of Professor Shiller’s students.
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“Estimatabilitating” Inestimatability

Were a liquid market in such index-tied instruments to
develop—with prices recorded and tracked by the financial press, on
centralized exchanges, or both—analysts and speculators increasingly
would be “incentivized” to set about seeking information bearing upon
the underlying values of the instruments. And that information would
be impounded in the instruments’ prices, in effect pooling social
knowledge and making it available to all. Risks themselves would be
dynamically, fairly, and socially optimally priced (assuming, of course,
that market participants enter the market upon fair and equal terms)
over time in view of available and ever-changing social knowledge.
People situated as were Bob and Barbara in the later 1980s or
early 1990s would be better able to assess the prudence of making
Bob’s and Barbara’s own vocational, locational, and real estatepurchasing decisions—and, of course, better able to hedge such bets as
they made. The earlier mentioned process of “justice-accounting”
would thus be eased, at least with respect to many risks. People situated
as Bob’s prospective insurers would be likewise advantaged. Contracts
between such parties would be more readily made with confidence
about what was being “bet” upon, and the contracts themselves would
be amenable to more temporally-flexibly defined—indeed, valuationally fluctuating—”bets.”
3. Symmetricalizing Asymmetric Information
The same information-uncovering, -pooling, and -impounding
effects just described would render information bearing upon future
wealth and income prospects more widely available. Information would
be more efficiently generated, pooled, publicized, and shared. Adverse
selection—the circumstance in which those wishing to sell risk-bearing
know more than those ready to purchase it—would considerably recede
as a problem.
So would moral hazard, in that individuals—other than, say,
Janet Yellen, the President, or particularly effective terrorists—
generally would be unable directly or significantly affect the values of
the underlying macroeconomic indices. Prospective insurers of Bob
and Barbara would worry less that he or she knows something that they
do not. And they would no longer need worry that Bob or Barbara
might actually bring about the eventuation of the risk that they were
seeking to insure.
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Where Is The Better Betting Market? Wherever We Build It

So why, then, does this “better betting market” not yet exist?
Much of the reason, I suggest, has been hinted at above.133 We are
faced with inertial challenges, grounded in contract and market structures predicated upon long-established expectations as to what sorts of
information can be generated, pooled, and shared; how often it can be
supplemented, pooled, and shared anew; and how transactions can be
framed around such information-technical modalities. But there are
other difficulties as well. So perhaps it will be well to enumerate them,
along with their likely means of solution.
A.

Indices and Index Numbers

The better betting markets that we’ve been imagining rely
upon macro-indices. These have to be constructed. The challenge that
this presents is that these are theoretically daunting to construct.134 The
task requires masses of data, and inherently contestable assignments of
“weights” to vector components in the reduction of vector to scalar
quantities. There is not yet a great deal of appreciated private incentive
for their production.
But there is an obvious solution. First, governments and/or
international organizations can establish a central database, at which
various instrumentalities that gather economic data can pool that data.
Then governments, nonprofits, public-minded professionals (e.g.,
ABA, the NASD, NARED, etc.), or some combination thereof can
develop the initial indices from those numbers. These might be supplemented later by private actors appreciating potential profits. The story
of the Human Genome Project serves as a telling example.135

133

See supra Part III.
See generally IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS: A STUDY
OF THEIR VARIETIES, TESTS, AND RELIABILITY (1922); CHENG HSIAO,
ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (1986); THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC
INDICES (Wolfgang Eichhorn et al. eds., 1978). See also SHILLER, MACRO
MARKETS, supra note 132, at 152-81.
135
The project began as a government effort until three private firms entered
the field. See, e.g., About NHGRI: A Brief History and Timeline, NAT’L
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001763 ((last
updated Jan. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3WVW-R83J.
134
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Supply-Side Incentives

Supply side incentive problems pose another challenge. Here,
the problem is possible rent-appropriation by imitators or marginal
improvers of newly invented instruments, the prospect of which might
serve to dissuade would-be innovators from even trying.136 We might
also worry here about demand-side inertia: Will there be sufficient
demand? (“Chicken and egg” again.)
Here too, however, an obvious solution would seem to lie on
hand. Again, government or public-spirited private sector actors
(academics, lawyers, investment professionals, etc.) can design the
initial instruments. Patent protection might be extended as well, if
necessary.137 We might try, for example, a new kind of patent—
affording a full monopoly on each new instrument, but limiting its
duration to two or three years.
C.

Demand-Side Incentives

Just like the supply side, the demand side present challenges.
Here the principal problem is apt to stem from simple unfamiliarity
with the exotic new instruments, or with finance more generally, for a
time.138 Fear of numbers, “rocket science,” “financial bingo,” “the
Wall Street game,” and/or unwillingness to learn of and devote
sustained attention to such matters would also play a role. Would-be
suppliers and demanders each await some sign from the others that this
might get underway. (Again, “chicken and egg.”)
136

See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Futures Markets: Their Purpose, Their
History, Their Growth, Their Successes and Failures, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS
237, 244 (1984); Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover
Advantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 214 (1989).
137
See, e.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 127, at 47-50. Bob Shiller and two
colleagues patented an instrument of this sort over a decade ago. Press Release,
Macro Sec. Research, Macro Securities Research Announces New Financial
Security (Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with author).
138
See, e.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 127, at 3-41, 157-97; Kimberly D.
Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to
Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (1997). But see Carolyn H.
Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer
Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3207 (1999) (“Retail derivative
activity is inevitable. . . . The risk management benefits of derivatives are too
substantial to be kept from consumers.”).
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Once again, though, there seems to be an obvious solution.
That is to “prime the pump.” Government, nonprofits, professional
associations, academics or some combination thereof can commence
public information and financial literacy campaigns. We might compare here health literacy, drug literacy, and related public information
campaigns. Note also that increasing popularity of lotteries might
represent an opportunity here. Tell folk, “this is a better way to bet”—a
way that is actually guaranteed, on balance, to lessen all-but-inevitable
losses.
Business schools might also develop financial counseling
clinics, analogous to legal aid clinics afforded by law schools. (I have
proposed such at Yale School of Management.) Vast infrastructure of
pension funds, mutual funds, retirement accounts, individual development accounts, etc. can be utilized here as well. Should supplemental
security income, for example, be supplemented by added “private
accounts,” citizens might be permitted or encouraged to add appropriate macro-hedging instruments, in effect insuring against their specific
net worth risks, to their individual accounts. The accounts would thus
evolve into, and be better conceived as, more general “riskmanagement accounts,” rather than simply retirement accounts.
Counseling services currently available to the middle class in
maintaining their individual retirement accounts and other investment
vehicles presumably could assist in the selection of such securities, and
feedback from such counselors could assist suppliers in the
development of optimally customized, while suitably standardized,
instruments. (Suze Orman and “Motley Fool” types presumably would
follow suit and clamber aboard the bandwagon.)
D.

Institutional Infrastructure

We will also need new financial intermediaries or exchanges
and brokerages, or expansions of existing ones, that require and
facilitate maintenance of margin accounts and enforceability mechanisms. But this can largely be handled via solutions of the kind already
noted. Government might also afford some start-up cost compensation
to existing institutions to put the necessary structures in place. We can
justify it by reference to current social insurance rationales, as well as
by those offered above—justice and efficiency.
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Regulatory Uncertainty

Another challenge might be posed by regulatory uncertainty.
Would the new macrosecurities fall within the SEC or the CFTC?
There might me similar uncertainties at the global scale. ERISA trust
regulations also might seem to prohibit or severely limit investment by
some financial intermediaries, notably pension funds, in such instruments. The solution here seems pretty obvious, though. Just decide
between SEC/CFTC. Provide some safe-harbor under ERISA for some
degree of experimentation with new hedging instruments as well. And,
of course, regulate the new markets carefully both on behalf their users,
through the CFPB, and as important components of a macroprudentially regulated financial system.139 As for global regulation, please see
Subsection F immediately below.
F.

Need of Global Cooperation

Finally, in order to secure maximal advantage from the
prospects offered by these new instruments and markets, we must
design them and draw counterparties taking opposite sides of them
without a view to international boundaries. Many of the instruments,
for example, would derive their values from transnational aggregates,
and many of the counterparties would hail from different jurisdictions.
We would thus require transnational agreement on indexing the
relevant aggregates and, therefore, on accounting principles. We will
also require, of course, a workable transnational contracting and
139

See Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety
and Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 201 (2015); Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning, and
Macroprudence, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Mar. 27, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/27/leaningcleaning-and-macroprudence/, archived at http://perma.cc/S869-6U3A; Robert
Hockett, Practical Guidance on Macroprudential Finance-Regulatory Reform,
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/22/practical-guidance-onmacroprudential-finance-regulatory-reform/, archived at http://perma.cc/
VUS5-KZ3E; Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The
Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. __ (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 15), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2239849, archived at http://perma.cc/CXJ8-8HLB.
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contract-enforcement regime, as well as, of course, a general securitiesand more general finance-regulatory regime to foster the widest, most
liquid possible market.
In many ways, however, global cooperation already is well
underway along the dimensions needed to secure a functioning global
market in the new securities. We have a regime of international contracting and contract enforcement, and we have both a developing
international consensus on accounting and financial solvency principles
and developing cooperation and shared mindsets on the part of global
finance-regulatory officials. Much of this development takes place
under the rubric of the “new international financial architecture”
fostered by the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Basle Committee of the
Bank for International Settlements, the G-20, and other organizations.140
The development of an individual citizen-friendly, global riskmarket regime would be a natural, and quite incremental, extension to
this already coalescing framework.141 The key is to ensure that the
140

For works on the “New International Financial Architecture,” see, e.g.,
BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 25-27 (1999); RICHARD J.
HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 120-51 (1995); PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE: WHAT’S NEW? WHAT’S MISSING? 87-117 (2001). See also
Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sustainable
Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 405 (2013); Robert Hockett,
From Macro to Micro to “Mission-Creep”: Defending the IMF’s Emerging
Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability,
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 154-58 (2002); Hockett, Just Insurance,
supra note 3, at 255; Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of
Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93, 94
(2005); Robert Hockett, Toward a Global Shareholder Society, 30 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 101, 181 (2008).
141
Some such data already is beginning to come online. See, e.g., Data, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (last updated Apr. 8,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/86LR-78BL; EDGAR, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V8DQ-J2P7; National
Economic Accounts, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS,
http://www.bea.gov/national/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/MPL7-QWZX; PANEL STUDY INCOME DYNAMICS,
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process be permitted to continue. One obstacle to that progress is, of
course, a growing disenchantment with global financial and economic
cooperation, which increasingly is seen by many as a source of grand
dislocation and injustice operating in the service of already wealthy
interests. Extension of global finance policy to embrace what we might
call “democratized global risk-management policy” might, then, not
only result in substantial justice and welfare gains to global society,
but, indeed, help to legitimate the international economic and financial
cooperation both through which those gains can best be made, and
which has done so much to occasion their need.
VI.

Conclusion

I trust and hope the point is made. We can insure much more in
the way of risks to incomes and assets upon which people below the
tops of wealth and income distributions rely than we do presently. All
we need do is develop the financial instruments and institutional infrastructures requisite to their betting on macro-aggregates that correlate,
in various ways, to their incomes and to the values of their assets.
Because such aggregates are observable and not moveable by individuals, and because growing use of these markets as fora for risk trading
will gradually facilitate more and more accurate risk pricing, enabling
parties to trade on them, will serve as a very close, very effective substitute for presently missing, more familiar insurance markets. Working
to enable this will be working to render the distribution of risks we all
face simultaneously more just and more efficient, largely in owing to
justice’s close family resemblance to efficient insurance.
Early in the summer of 2006, as the hurricane season opened,
it emerged that some “online gaming” sites were offering bettors the
opportunity to bet upon whether another Katrina-like horror might

http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/9GL6-HQXQ; The System of National Accounts (SNA),
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT ECON. & SOC. AFF. STAT. DIVISION, http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/ATF8-HLYG. Note, in this connection, similar
proposals made by Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A
Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 59-70 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972); R.H.
COASE, The Institutional Structure of Production, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS
AND ECONOMISTS 3, 10-14 (1994).
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strike New Orleans again.142 Television commentators and others
decried the crass tastelessness, even heartlessness, of these offerings.
Perhaps they were right. All I could think about, however, was how
lovely it now might become, that New Orleanians and others at last
might insure against flooding—often offered as the literal textbook case
of an uninsurable, because definitionally “wavelike,” event.143 In effect,
what the online gamers were offering was a chance to broaden the riskpool for New Orleanian flooding well beyond New Orleans, thereby
rendering flood insurance at long last available to New Orleanians.
That would have rendered the distribution of that form of risk both
more just and efficient than it had been thitherto.
What I am advocating in this essay is, in effect, simply that we
re-think that attitude toward the gamers. Instead of categorically
condemning them, we should use them. For what they offer, ironically,
is more justice and more efficiency—in a world in which risks appear
every day more to proliferate.
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See Wanna Bet That a Hurricane Will Hit U.S.? Now You Can, supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying note 81.

